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Abstract 
“Security and Policy for Group Collaboration” was a Collaboratory Middleware research project aimed at 
providing the fundamental security and policy infrastructure required to support the creation and operation 
of distributed, computationally enabled collaborations. The project developed infrastructure that exploits 
innovative new techniques to address challenging issues of scale, dynamics, distribution, and role. To 
reduce greatly the cost of adding new members to a collaboration, we developed and evaluated new 
techniques for creating and managing credentials based on public key certificates, including support for 
online certificate generation, online certificate repositories, and support for multiple certificate authorities. 
To facilitate the integration of new resources into a collaboration, we improved significantly the 
integration of local security environments. To make it easy to create and change the role and associated 
privileges of both resources and participants of collaboration, we developed community wide authorization 
services that provide distributed, scalable means for specifying policy. These services make it possible for 
the delegation of capability from the community to a specific user, class of user or resource. Finally, we 
instantiated our research results into a framework that makes it useable to a wide range of collaborative 
tools. The resulting mechanisms and software have been widely adopted within DOE projects and in many 
other scientific projects. The widespread adoption of our Globus Toolkit technology has provided, and 
continues to provide, a natural dissemination and technology transfer vehicle for our results. 
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A. Narrative 
A.1. Introduction 
This SciDAC project has developed software and tools to enforce required security policies in DOE’s 
major distributed science projects. 
Scientific advances today are almost exclusively the result of large collaborative teams. The Department of 
Energy SciDAC program contains many examples of such collaborative teams:  
• High energy physics: Particle physics experiments, such as BABAR, CMS, and ATLAS, are 
designed and conducted by large, multinational teams. Subsets of the team might be responsible 
for the design of the detector, various pieces of software for on-line data collection, data 
preprocessing and event detection. Team members use shared data sets for analysis and may use 
community wide compute resources for data analysis.  
• Earth System Grid (ESG): Scientists studying global climate change perform extensive post-
simulation analysis in order to attempt to understand the results of a simulation. While a small 
team may develop the simulation code, separate groups may configure and run the code to 
generate data about a specific phenomenon. At this point, the simulation data becomes a 
community resource that has a variety of uses. 
• National Fusion Collaboratory (NFC): This community has for over a decade utilized remote 
monitoring and control of select instruments. Magnetic fusion experiments are conducted at three 
large experimental sites, which distribute large amounts of data to a theoretical and simulation 
community, which works with the experimental team to create realistic 3D plasma models. 
These examples illustrate four essential properties of collaborative work: 
• Geographical and organizational distribution. Participants in a collaborative activity are 
distributed, both geographically and organizationally, as are the tools and resources used to 
perform the work of the collaboration (e.g., computers, data sets, storage devices, simulation 
programs). 
• Large and dynamic scale. Collaborations can scale in size from a few individuals to literally 
hundreds or thousands of participants, which is the case of many high-energy physics experiments. 
Furthermore, the membership of participants of a collaboration is not static, but frequently varies 
over the lifetime of the collaborative task. Participants may join or leave, and resources may be 
added or removed  
• Diverse roles. Collaborations may span areas of expertise, with members filling different roles 
within the collaboration. The role of a member may be fixed for the duration of the collaboration, 
or it may change during its lifetime. For example, in the case of climate modeling there are distinct 
roles with associated specific rights of the simulation writer, the simulation runner, and the 
consumer of simulation data. 
• Community resources. The work of the team is enabled by providing team members with access to 
a variety of resources including computers, storage systems, datasets, applications, and tools. Thus 
in a real sense, a collaboration is not just the group of individuals participating in the activity, but 
the resources that can be used by members of the collaboration to conduct their work. 
In order for such collaborations to succeed, participants must have means to perform the work of the 
collaboration: e.g., mechanisms for annotating and cataloging information so that it may be understood by 
members of the collaboration, electronic notebooks for sharing what processes had been followed, 
interfaces that make computing resources available for use, methods for discovering and initiating 
simulation codes, etc. Most work on collaboration tools focuses on the development of these tools.  
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In order for the collaboration to be effective, its participants must also have mechanisms for establishing 
and maintaining the structure of the collaboration. Users and resources are rarely fully devoted to any 
particular collaboration, but instead remain bound by policies and technologies that are in place at their 
home organization and in other collaborations of which they are a part. 
The foundation of these mechanisms for collaboration structure is the ability to identify the collaboration 
members (authentication) and determine what their specific roles and privileges are (authorization). This 
process of authentication and authorization is non-trivial due to the number of parties that contribute policy 
to authorization process – the collaboration, the resource sites, the resource managers, and the users are all 
examples of entities, which have a stake in the authorization process. The complexity of combining these 
different policies is increased by several factors: 
The policies to be combined may be dynamic and diverse. The collaboration may need to change its policy 
as users or contributed resources change, when its goals change, or the collaboration may begin with only 
a rudimentary idea of what its policies should be and formulate more appropriate policies over time. 
Policies from the site or other parties may similarly change. This requires mechanisms for forming the 
combined policy must be capable of acquiring and combining these policies in real-time as the policy is 
applied. 
Policies and the attribute and identity credentials they depend on, come in a variety of forms. 
Unfortunately we have many standards for expressing policies and attributes. Different sites and 
collaborations have in the past, and will continue in the future, continue to select different mechanisms 
(e.g. X.509 attribute certificates, SAML assertions, LDAP) for legitimate reasons. A system that supports 
the combining of policies and attributes from multiple sources must be capable of dealing with different 
formats. 
Policies vary in granularity. In some cases policy will need to be fine-grained, e.g., expressing access to 
individual files, while in other cases they will be rather coarse-grained, e.g., only users with DOE Grids 
identity certificates may use this service. This requires that the enforcement system for the resulting policy 
be flexible. For example, a system designed to only enforce access control to a site may not be capable of 
differentiating between what file is being referenced in a request 
Policies cover a wide range of resources. Collaborations are not concerned with only a single type of 
resource (e.g., computation, data storage, visualization, instruments), but with a wide range. This requires 
the policy and enforcement systems to be broadly applicable. 
A.2. Project Summary 
At the time that this project began, GSI provided simple mechanisms for authentication, authorization, and 
delegation. During the course of this project, we have designed and developed software components to 
facilitate adding users to a collaboration, managing policies within a collaboration, evaluating and 
enforcing policy information, and managing delegated credentials. We have also integrated our security 
framework with applications for the Earth Systems Grid (ESG) project and remained active in standards 
activities, both in terms of adopting emerging standards in our components and in participating in 
standards activities. 
1. Adding users to a collaboration. We have developed the Portal-based User Registration System 
(PURSE), which simplifies the process of adding users to a collaboration by providing an easy-to-use Web 
interface for potential users of an application to “register” themselves and request sign-in credentials. 
Administrators receive requests and decide whether to grant them. When a user is registered, a Grid 
credential is created on his behalf and used “behind the scenes” whenever he uses the application.  
PURSE combines the Simple CA and MyProxy components with a back-end database and a web portal to 
automate user registration requests. The registration interface solicits basic data from user, including a 
desired ID/password combination. Requests are forwarded by email to an administrator and the data from 
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the requests are stored in a database. The administrator uses administrative functions in the web portal to 
process requests. Users receive email notification when their accounts are ready for use. 
Key benefits of this approach are: 
• Users never have to see or manage their Grid credentials. 
• The MyProxy service is automatically populated with user credentials which can be retrieved 
either from web portal interfaces or from desktop systems using the MyProxy client tools. 
• A database is automatically populated with basic information about all application users. 
• The registration service, user credentials, and MyProxy service can be re-used in other 
applications. 
We successfully integrated the PURSE system in the Earth System Grid (ESG) portal (Figure 1) as the 
primary authentication infrastructure service, which is in full production mode without any major issues. 
 
Figure 1. Earth System Grid Security 
2. Managing policies within a collaboration. We have developed the Community Authorization Service 
(CAS: Figure 2) to manage VO-wide policies regarding resources distributed across multiple sites. 
Clients interact with a CAS server to obtain a SAML authorization assertion that is signed by the CAS-
associated authorization authority. The client then presents the assertion to the application server, which, to 
the extent that it trusts the authorization authority that signed the assertion, will use that policy information 
to evaluate the client’s access rights. The signed authorization may be embedded in the client’s proxy 
certificate as a non-critical extension or pushed to the server using an application-specific mechanism; 
alternatively, the application server may query the CAS server directly using our standardized SAML 
authorization query interface. 
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Figure 2: CAS server requests 
Over the course of this project, the CAS server has evolved in response to developing standards and user 
requirements. CAS was implemented first using an XML-RPC based protocol before becoming an OGSI-
based, and finally a WSRF-based service. Its policy assertions were initially expressed in an ad-hoc policy 
language, then in SAML. 
3. Evaluating, combining, and enforcing policies from multiple sources. We have designed and 
implemented a generalized authorization framework and attribute collection framework, which provide 
extensible mechanisms to evaluate policy and attribute information from multiple heterogeneous sources. 
The Globus Authorization Framework (Figure 3) is an extensible runtime module that evaluates external 
policies and assertions via a plugin interface and combines the results to make authorization decisions in a 
consistent and policy-driven way. More and more DOE deployments use sophisticated authorization 
models requiring that the policy enforcement point either make callouts to external authorization servers or 
handle pushed authorization assertions in different formats.  
 
Figure 2: Globus Authorization Framework  
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In this framework, an authorization engine gathers attribute information from Policy Information Points 
(PIPs), queries Policy Decision Points (PDPs) to determine whether the request would be allowed under 
one or more policies, and combines the result to make a final access control decision for each client 
request. Since the Globus Toolkit’s runtime includes natural policy enforcement points, the Authorization 
Engine is called at those points to provide access control decisions before any application code is called. 
The Authorization Framework provides plug-in interfaces for PDPs and PIPs, which are configurable at 
run time. This code is part of the Globus Toolkit core. 
As most DOE deployments are moving or have expressed desire to move towards an attribute-based 
authorization policies, support for the consistent and generic processing of the different attribute assertions 
is required. The attributes are expressed in different formats, such as X509 Attribute certificates and 
SAML, are either pushed by the clients or retrieved from attribute services, and have to be presented to the 
subsequent policy decision point where the policy expressions are evaluated that rely on the attribute 
values. With the lessons learned from our GridShib experiences, we have designed and implemented an 
attribute collection framework that collects, validates and standardizes the attributes before they are 
handed hoff to the authorization-processing phase. Together with the before mentioned authorization 
processing functionality, this working code is currently being validated for correctness and is expected to 
become part of the Globus Toolkit core. 
4. Management of delegated credentials. Grid applications often need to delegate user credentials to 
servers, in order to allow those servers to access other grid resources on the user’s behalf. GSI has long 
supported a mechanism for delegation, but this mechanism has two limitations. First, it requires that a new 
key pair be generated for each delegation, which can be a somewhat computationally-expensive process. 
Second, if the delegated credential expires, there is no way to renew it, which means that users who (for 
example) use grid services to spawn long-running jobs must be able to predict in advance how long their 
jobs will take, or run the risk that their delegated credential will expire before their job has completed. 
Users can work around the expiring-credential problem by delegating long-lived credentials, but by doing 
so they subject themselves to increased risk that those credentials will be compromised. To address these 
issues, we have implemented a Delegation Service, which provides a mechanism for users to delegate 
credentials to services and to refresh previously-delegated credentials. The caching provided by the 
Delegation Service provides performance enhancements, by reducing the number of (relatively expensive) 
delegation options performed when several service invocations are made by the same user within a short 
period of time. The credential refresh mechanism enables users to ensure that long-running jobs will 
continue to have the credentials they need to access grid resources without incurring the risk associated 
with delegating a long-lived credential. 
5. Integration with ESG applications. While users interact through ESG’s portal application to browse 
and select files for download, ESG’s group/role-based authorization system determines the user’s access to 
its local and remote resources. The associated authorization decisions are translated in so-called SAML 
authorization assertions, which are digitally signed tokens that state that the ESG portal as an authorization 
authority allows the subject to transfer certain file(s). By using a format of these tokens identical to those 
generated by CAS (Community Authorization Service), we are able to leverage the CAS-enable GridFTP 
servers “out of the box.” The result is that the GridFTP servers will honor the ESG’s authorization 
decisions. The required code changes in our SAML-associated authorization code have been completed 
and delivered to ESG and the data-mover clients are expected to deploy the issued SAML assertions 
shortly for GridFTP.  
ESG requires that multiple files often must be transferred from the same GridFTP server, while at the start 
of the GridFTP session not all the authorization decisions have been received yet. The standard CAS / 
GridFTP clients embed authorization assertions in the proxy certificate used to authenticate to the GridFTP 
server, which limits the authorization assertions that can be used in a GridFTP session to those available at 
the time the session is created.  We have designed and implemented an alternative mechanism that enables 
clients to communicate new authorization assertions to the server over the GridFTP control channel at any 
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time during a session. 
6. Standards. Our new components are, to the extent possible, based on established or emerging standards 
– for example, CAS is a WSRF service that issues assertions expressed in SAML. We have also been 
active in community standards activities: 
• The OGSA Authorization working group’s “Use of SAML for OGSI Authorization” and “OGSI 
Authorization Requirements” drafts have passed the public comment period in the Global Grid 
Forum; no issues are identified. 
• The X.509 Proxy Certificate Profile became an Internet RFC (RFC 3820) in June 2004. 
• The OGSA’s working group’s “OGSA‚ WSRF Basic Profile 1.0 “, “OGSA Basic Security Profile 
1.0 – Core” and “OGSA Basic Security Profile 1.0 – Secure Channel” have progressed and have 
been submitted for review. 
• The Web Service Security V1.1 and the XACML V2.0 specifications, with our contributions, have 
been promoted to standards in OASIS. 
• We continued to participate in Web services security standards work in OASIS, namely, XACML, 
SAML, Web Service Security, and Web Services Secure Exchange. 
• We helped organize a well-received workshop at GGF15 in Boston in October, 2005. This 
workshop is documented in "Report for the GGF 15 Community Activity: Leveraging Site 
Infrastructure for Multi-Site Grids". 
• We continued our activities to ensure smooth operation of the DOE Grids CA by participating as a 
member of its policy management authority. 
A.3. Overall Assessment 
The impact of the project on both computer science and DOE science has been tremendous. The project 
has produced authentication and authorization algorithms and software that have been adopted by 
hundreds of major distributed science projects and form the basis for the vast majority of science grid 
deployments. Thousands of scientists access remote data and computational services securely thanks to 
Grid Security Infrastructure. These projects and scientists have in turn profited from the availability of 
high-quality secure authentication and authorization mechanisms to achieve significant advances in 
distributed science. The following are just three examples: 
• The DOE Earth System Grid (ESG) data portal has used Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) 
mechanisms to register over one thousand climate researchers as users during the past year. These 
users have downloaded tens of terabytes of data from ESG sites and produced 250 publications 
from International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) data alone.  
• The Fusion Collaboratory uses GSI mechanisms to provide secure remote access to advanced 
fusion codes, increasing by an order of magnitude the number of simulations performed relative to 
past practice.  
• Participants in the DOE Particle Physics Data Grid (PPDG) collaboration have used GSI 
mechanisms to enable not only high energy and nuclear physicists but also biologists and chemists 
to harness computers and storage at 50 sites across the U.S. for large-scale distributed data 
analysis. This work has reduced significantly the time required to produce analyses of data from 
physics and biology experiments. 
A.4. Future Directions 
We want to work with the members of an NSF-funded effort to integrate our Globus Toolkit with 
Internet2’s Shibboleth, which will allow us to leverage Shibboleth/SAML attribute services for our 
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CAS/XACML authorization. Many of the ideas for the generic attribute collection framework were a result 
of our collaboration, and the expectation is that the SciDAC community will benefit from sophisticated 
attribute services in the policy enforcement within their collaboratories. 
We want to make the PURSE, CAS/SAML-libraries, enhanced GridFTP and CAS features, and attribute 
collection and authorization framework available to other SciDAC DOE projects. In addition, many NSF 
projects (LSST, GEON) are planning and working to leverage various of these components. This wider 
adoption provides us with further sources of feedback and experience. 
We want to continue to collaborate with the DOE National Collaboratories to define future directions for 
information technology within the DOE’s research agenda. The CET SciDAC proposal “Security for Open 
Science” from ANL, LBNL, NERSC, ESnet, NCSA, PNNL, UofWisconsin, UofDelaware, and 
UofVirginia, provides a roadmap to implement the security-related features to address the critical issues 
for secure collaboration in DOE as stated by Open Science Grid (OSG), Earth System Grid (ESG), 
FusionGrid, NERSC, NLCF. The proposed program of work are in four interrelated areas: 
• Auditing and Forensics: Services to enable sites, communities, and application scientists to 
determine precisely who did what, where and when. 
• Dynamic Host Firewall Port Management: Services to open and close ports dynamically for 
applications while enforcing site policy. 
• Identity Management: Services to seamlessly manage identity and access control across sites and 
collaborations, and to allow for rapid response to security incidents. 
• Secure Middleware: Services to proactively find and fix software vulnerabilities and guarantee 
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